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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE NEW JUDICIAL

FEDERALISM: WHY STATE COURTS SHOULD NOT
CONSIDER OUT-OF - STATE BACKLASH
NEAL DEVINS

I. I NTRODUCTION

Thirty years after Justice William Brennan's call for state courts to "step into the
breach" left by the U.S. Supreme Court's supposed underenforcement of individual rights protections, the contours of the "new judicial federalism" remain a
mystery. 1 There is, of course, the methodological question about whether state
courts should rely on state-specific sources (the text and history of the state constitution) and, in so doing, develop a "coherent discourse of state constitutional
law."2 More fundamentally, does Brennan's call for a new judicial federalism
have anything to do with federalism or is Brennan simply a "false prophet,"
asking states to pick up the slack for a recalcitrant Supreme Court and pursuing
the Warren Court's nationalistic agenda of expanding civil and individual rights
protections? 3 Under this view, it simply does not matter whether state courts
employ a "coherent discourse of state constitutional law"; all that matters is that
state courts expand rights protections.
In sorting out whether the "new federalism" has anything to do with federalism, traditionally understood, this chapter considers recent battles over same-sex
marriage. In particular, I will examine whether state courts should consider outof-state backlash when deciding cases. For example, when assessing whether to
extend marriage protections to same-sex couples, should the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court have taken into account the possibility that its ruling
would contribute to the electoral defeat of presidential candidate John Kerry or
the enactment of state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage?
If the "new federalism" is simply a rallying call for the nationalistic expansion of
rights, such out-of-state effects should matter. But if the "new federalism" is
about sovereign, independent states serving as "laboratories" where new legal

1. William J. Brennan , Jr. , State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
L. R EV. 489, 503 (1977).
2. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MIC H. L. REv.
761, 764 (1992).
H ARV.

3. Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional
Law, 15 HAsT. CoNST. L.Q . 429 (1988) .
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concepts can be tried out, there is simply no principled reason for state courts to
take out-of-state resistance into account.
In the pages that follow, I will argue that the new judicial federalism should be
something more than window dressing for an outcome-driven nationalistic agenda.
For this very reason, I will defend the decision ofthe Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court to protect same-sex marriage in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.
Unlike critics of the decision, I will argue that the Massachusetts court did not
engage in judicial overreaching by failing to take into account out-of-state backlash.
At the same time, I will explain why state courts should take into account in-state
backlash when deciding cases. State courts cannot serve as laboratories in a new
judicial federalism if their decisions are ignored or nullified. Likewise, state courts
cannot pursue doctrinal innovations if judges fail to win reelection because they
pursued politically unacceptable causes. In other words, just as the U.S. Supreme
Court seeks to protect its turf and maximize its influence over the other branches,
state supreme courts should take implementation concerns into account.
This chapter proceeds in two parts. First, I will explain why state courts should
pay attention to in-state but not out-of-state backlash. I will discuss both the need
for courts to pay attention to the practical consequences of their decisions and
how that need should be channeled through the lens of the "new judicial
federalism." Moreover, in arguing that state courts should not consider the extraterritorial effects of their decisions, I will draw a distinction between two types of
out-of-state backlash. Although state courts should not consider the potential
out-of-state backlash of their decisions, it is nevertheless sensible for state courts
to look to the experiences of other states in assessing whether there will be an
in-state backlash. State courts, in other words, are both independent (doing right
by the citizens of their state without considering negative out-of-state effects)
and part of a national system (recognizing that the experiences of other states are
instructive in assessing what type of decision best serves in-state interests).
Second, I will apply the principles of the first part of the chapter to same-sex
marriage, focusing my attention on four states that rejected state prohibitions
against it: Hawaii (1993) , Vermont (1999), Massachusetts (2003), and California
(2008). By looking at the state political culture at the time of the decision, I will
criticize the decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court, defend the decisions of the
Massachusetts and Vermont courts, and offer a mixed assessment of the
California Supreme Court. In Hawaii, the state supreme court went out of its
way to push its views upon a reluctant legislature and hostile electorate. In sharp
contrast, courts in Vermont and Massachusetts took steps to minimize conflict
and, in so doing, staved off efforts to undermine these court decisions through
legislation or constitutional amendments. Vermont and Massachusetts are
instructive for another reason: because it is extremely difficult to amend the state
constitutions in these two states, the decisions of these courts are largely
insulated from potential voter backlash. In sharp contrast, many western states
facilitate voter-driven constitutional initiatives. For this very reason, the California
court-while having reason to believe that its decision would be acceptable to
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state political leaders and perhaps a majority of California voters-should have
considered delaying its same-sex marriage ruling.

II. POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY AND THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM

State court judges should care whether people would be outraged by their
rulings.• In part, courts have no choice but to be consequentialist. Lacking the
power of the purse and the sword, a judge's power "rests on the willingness of
the public, and the political actors accountable to it, to respect his independence
and the decrees of the court."5 Beyond the practical necessity of taking potential
backlash into account, the new judicial federalism offers a second account of
why state courts ought to consider the consequences of their decisions. The new
federalism is premised on the belief that constitutionalism is not a "single set of
truths" but rather an ongoing national discourse about "ideas ofliberty, equality,
and due process."6 Under this view, state courts learn from each other so that one
state's experience informs the decision making of another state . State courts
therefore should look to other states in assessing the effectiveness of competing
decisional rules. In saying that state courts should pay attention to consequences,
however, the new federalism draws a sharp line between a state court learning
from another state's experience and its recalibrating a decisional rule for fear of
out-of-state backlash. The new federalism, properly understood, treats state
courts as independent entities-not simply part of a larger national discourse.
This section will spell out these two accounts of why state courts ought to be
consequentialist. First, I will detail the institutional incentives for courts, especially state courts, to take backlash into account. Second, I will discuss the "new
judicial federalism," focusing on the fundamental distinction between in- and
out-of-state backlash.
A. Institutional Incentives

Supreme court justices (both state and federal) have "institutional preferences
that may enhance or weaken the strength of [their] ideological preferences." 7
4. This sentence plays off the title of Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by
Their Rulings, Should judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REv. 155 (2007). Like Sunstein's article, this
section will consider both normative and consequential arguments about the relevance of
backlash. Unlike Sunstein, however, I will consider this question through the lens of the
new judicial federalism-where states are at once independent and part of a national
dialogue about the appropriate scope of rights protections. By contrast, Sunstein's analysis
seems tied to a unitary court system and is therefore most useful in thinking about U.S.
Supreme Court interpretations of federal law.
5. Barry Friedman, The Politics ofJudicial Review, 84 TEx. L. REv. 257 (2005).
6. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1147, 1147 (1993).
7. Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading
ofUnited States v. Lopez, 46 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 757, 783 (1996).
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In particular, implementation concerns sometimes figure into court decisions.
This is true for the U.S. Supreme Court (where life tenure and an extremely
burdensome constitutional amendment process significantly reduce the risk of
backlash). And it is especially true for state supreme courts (where, in many
states, there is great risk of backlash because of judicial elections, interest groupdriven initiatives, and the relative ease of amending state constitutions).
In understanding why courts should take backlash into account, consequentialists focus their attention on whether court rulings actually advance the goals
intended by the court. A second reason why consequentialists should care about
backlash is the larger interest of courts to maintain judicial power in our system
of divided government. Each of these arguments has common sense appeal, and
each argument is tied to one of the dominant models that political scientists use
to explain Supreme Court decision making (external strategic actor and new
institutionalism). 8 Embracing the teachings of the external strategic actor model,
consequentialists argue that judges should be both goal-oriented and strategic so
that "the preferences and likely actions of other relevant actors" shape the contours of judicial decision making. 9 Under this view, judges should be policy maximizers, advancing preferred outcomes without risking a counterproductive
backlash. Second, by making use of the new intuitionalism, consequentialists
argue that judges seek to preserve, if not strengthen, the court's institutional
capital. Specifically, the new institutionalism emphasizes that the Supreme
Court has institutional as well as policy-maximizing goals. Under this view,
Supreme Court justices see the Court as an institution whose identity is defined
by patterns of interaction with other parts of government. Accordingly, the Court
cannot lose sight of its responsibilities to "maintain a distinctive and valued presence in the political system" by advancing some "vision of the special functions
that [it] should perform." 10

8. A third political science model, the attitudinalist model, claims that U.S. Supreme
Court justices vote their policy preferences without fear of political backlash. See JEFFREY
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED (2002) . Defenders of this model contend that the U.S. Supreme Court is largely
irisulated from political backlash; consequently, there is no reason for the justices to calibrate their decisions iri anticipation of political backlash. Although generally correct, the
attitudinalist model overstates matters. As the balance of this section will demonstrate,
the attitudinalist model does not extend to state supreme courts-where fears of political
reprisals are often substantial.
9. Lee Epsteiri et al., The Political (Science) Context ofjudging, 47 ST. Louis L.J . 783,
800 (2003). For a more detailed explication of this model, see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT,
THE CHoicEs JusTICES MAKE (1997).
10. Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive
Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SuPREME CouRT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 85 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard
Gillman, eds., 1999) .
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Examples of the U.S. Supreme Court taking social and political forces into
account when deciding cases are legion. Numerous studies have empirically
established that the Court shapes its "decisions and methods according to their
perceived vulnerability to congressional override" and that it takes "cues regarding public and political interest and acceptability of outcomes from the public
and organized interests." 11
State courts likewise take into account potential opposition to their rulings.
As one state supreme court justice put it: "There's no way a judge is going to be
able to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions . .. . That would be
like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub." 12 In death penalty cases, empirical
studies demonstrate that "politicization of the death issue has affected state court
behavior."13 More relevant to this chapter (and something I will discuss in greater
detail in the next section) , the Vermont Supreme Court made explicit reference
to its fear of political reprisals in explaining why there was a state constitutional
right to civil unions but not to same-sex marriage.
State courts are especially sensitive to possible in-state backlash for two reasons. First, state constitutions are much easier to amend than the federal constitution. Of more than 5,000 proposed amendments to the U.S . Constitution, only
seventeen have been approved since the Bill of Rights and only three amendments explicitly overruled decisions of the U.S . Supreme Court. State constitutions , in contrast, have been amended more than 5,000 times.14 From 1996-1997,
for example, forty-two states considered 233 proposed constitutional amendments,
approving 178 of them. 15 Second, state judges are often subject to direct democratic control. In the majority of states, justices are either elected or subject to
retention votes. Empirical studies back up the common sense notion that judicial selection methods "significantly affect judicial policy in several important
areas of the law."16 Indeed, the success of interest groups in pushing for either

11. Tonja jacobi, Sharing the Love: The Political Power of Remedial Delay in Same-Sex
Marriage Cases, 15 LAw & SEXUALITY REv. 11 , 28 (2006) (citing studies). See also NEAL
DEVINS & LOUIS FISH ER, TH E DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004); Frank B. Cross & Blake
). Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U.L. REv.
1437 (2001) .
12. This quote comes from California Supreme Court justice Otto Kaus. It is favorably

quoted by Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert F. Utter in State Constitutional Law,
The United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability, 64 WASH. L. REv. 19
(1989).
13. john Blume & Theodore Eisenberg. judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case
Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. C AL. L. REv. 465 , 503 (1999) .
14. john Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal System, 496 ANNALS 12, 14 (Mar.
1988) .
15. Janice C. May, Amending State Constitutions 1996-97, 30 RuTG ERS L.J. 1025 (1999) .
16. DANI EL R. PINELLO, TH E IMPACT OF jUDICIAL-S ELECTION METHOD ON STATE·
SUPREME-CO URT POLI CY130 (1996) .
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the election or removal of state court judges has called into question the
impartiality of state court decision making and, more generally, is considered a
profound threat to the independence of state court systems.
Not only are state courts less insulated from popular reprisals than federal
courts, state courts are far better positioned than federal courts to weigh the costs
and benefits of potential backlash: "[S]tate judges are systematically exposed to
and experienced in the legal institutions of their states;" "state judges spend
their professional lives dealing with state legislation and administration regulation;" "[t]hey are much more likely than are their federal counterparts to know or
be able to learn readily what is out there, how it came to be, and how well or badly
it works." 17
Of course, state court knowledge of in-state traditions does not extend beyond
state boundaries. State judges know about their states and can make consequentialist judgments about the potential backlash of a decision there. But state
judges do not know about the on-the-ground facts and legal traditions of other
states, so they cannot be expected to make informed judgments about out-ofstate backlash.
Another reason that state judges ought not to think about out-of-state backlash is tied to the new judicial federalism. Although part of a national discourse,
state courts must retain their essential sovereignty-an issue that I will now
address.
B. The New Judicial Federalism and Out-of-State Backlash

The new judicial federalism sees the states as critical players in the shaping of
national constitutional values. Although there are as many iterations of this "new
federalism" as there are law professors and judges who have written on this
topic, proponents generally fall into one of two camps. The fault line here is
whether a state court has some obligation to undertake an independent analysis
of the state's constitution or, alternatively, may it "simply disagree with contemporary Supreme Court methods or doctrines in applying its state constitution
without searching for special reasons in the state's text or traditions"? 18
Without minimizing the importance of this question, let me suggest a paradigm shift so that the focus of the inquiry becomes the implementation of a state
court's preferred doctrine. This question has received no attention in the literature, even though state courts have been criticized for not taking out-of-state
backlash into account. Decisions by the Hawaii and Massachusetts Supreme
Court on same-sex marriage have been savaged on these very grounds (principally by supporters of same-sex marriage) as "disastrous" and "provok[ing] the
17. Lawrence Gene Sager, State Courts and the Strategic Space between the Norms and
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 959, 976 (1985) .
18. Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions are Not Common Law, 24 RuTGERS L.J. 927, 931
(1993).
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biggest anti-gay backlash since the McCarthy era."19 In the next section, I will
discuss this backlash, but for now I want to focus on whether and when state
courts should think about out-of-state implementation.
Federalism assumes that states have different laws and that state supreme
courts speak authoritatively about the meaning of state law. Correspondingly, in
determining whether to embrace one or another legal rule, state courts have
unique responsibilities to their citizens rather than to the country as a whole. In
particular, state courts ought not to limit the rights of their citizens in order to
stave off a potential out-of-state backlash (assuming that out-of-state backlash
does not boomerang into a federal constitutional amendment or federal law that
undermines a state court ruling) .
There is a second reason that state courts ought not to consider out-of-state
backlash. For states to serve as laboratories in a nationwide conversation about
constitutional values, states must experiment. In-state backlash is relevant to
these experiments, but out-of-state backlash has no bearing on them. Specifically,
state courts must preserve space in which they are allowed to experiment. In-state
backlash undercuts judicial authority and may limit the types of experiments
that states can pursue. Out-of-state backlash is quite another matter. Assuming
no in-state boomerang effect, out-of-state backlash has no bearing on in-state
experimentation.
At the same time , state courts can learn from the implementation experiences
of other states. If interest groups (especially national interest groups) seek to
oust judges or pursue constitutional reforms in one state, there is no reason to
think those groups will not seek to countermand similar decision making in
other states. And if these efforts either fail or are not pursued in the first instance,
state courts may have reason to think that they have greater room for experimentation. Separate and apart from direct repeal efforts, state courts may see whether
those subject to a court order follow it or, alternatively, resist the ruling by either
dragging their feet or ignoring it altogether. If there is some type of nonaquiesence, it may make sense to pursue a different remedial strategy.
This, of course, is what the new judicial federalism is all about-state courts
learning from each other and "contributing to the larger project of interpreting
shared constitutional text." 20 Sometimes state courts will be pathbreakers, pursuing doctrinal innovations that may shape decision making in other states. At
other times states will wait and see if other states' approaches point to a better
way of interpreting state law. Whatever role a state chooses to play, out-of-state
backlash ought not to limit state innovations.

19. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Lookingfor Change in All the Wrong Places,
54 DRAK E L. REV. 795, 812 (2006) ; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. , EQUALITY PRACTICE 26
(2002) .
20. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Values of Dialogue and the New judicial
Federalism, 28 HAST. CaNST. L.Q. 93 , 137 (2000) .
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One final observation before turning to the same-sex marriage case study:
state judges are engaged in two distinct, interrelated constitutional dialogues. To
the extent that state courts pay attention to what has happened in other states
and make doctrinal moves that inform the judgments of other state courts, the
new judicial federalism has a nationalistic cast. Most advocates of the new federalism emphasize this side of things, talking broadly about the "values placed in
a constitution" and about constitutionalism as "not a single set of truths , but an
ongoing debate about the meaning of the rule of law in a democratic political
order." 21 But states are not simply minions in some larger national enterprise.
State courts also participate in an intrastate dialogue that includes state lawmakers and voters. They "need not apologize for undercutting national unity" if they
validate the ways in which states are different from one another. 22

Ill. THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

Academic and popular commentary about state court efforts to extend marriage
or civil union rights to same-sex couples has largely focused on out-of-state backlash. In particular, the Hawaii and Massachusetts supreme courts have been
sharply criticized for triggering a host of anti-gay legislative enactments and constitutional amendments. These attacks have largely ignored the question of
whether these courts operated within their state's social and political norms. In
the pages that follow, I will address that very question.
My discussion will be organized chronologically, focusing on rulings by the
supreme courts of Hawaii (1993), Vermont (1999), Massachusetts (2003), and
California (2008). In so doing, I will call attention to the way state courts can
learn from the experiences of other states while, at the same time, respecting
essential state sovereignty by refusing to consider the extraterritorial effects of
their decisions. This, as Section I details, is the core principle of the new federalism-a principle that allows states to be both independent and part of a national
conversation. It is also a principle at odds with the nationalistic goals of Justice
Brennan and other proponents of rights-expanding state court decision making.
In particular, state courts may sometimes have good reasons (consistent with the
new federalism) to expand in-state rights while simultaneously prompting an
out-of-state backlash that frustrates the pursuit of a nationwide expansion of
rights.
Bad Beginnings: Hawaii. The nationwide debate over same-sex marriage was
triggered by Baehr v. Lewin,23 a 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision that found
21. Kahn, supra note 6, at 1148; Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State
Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REv. 389, 442 (1998) .
22. Linde, supra note 18, at 932.
23 . 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) .
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Hawaii's prohibition of same-sex marriage to be gender discrimination. Rather
than formally grant same-sex couples the right to marry, however, the court
remanded the case to see if the state could demonstrate that its prohibition
satisfied strict scrutiny review. Over the next five years (while the litigation
worked its way back towards the Hawaii Supreme Court), Hawaii lawmakers
struggled with the court's decision. On the one hand, the lawmakers reached out
to gays and lesbians by enacting domestic partnership laws and, in so doing,
established "the most sweeping protections ever offered to same-sex couples
anywhere in the U.S." 24 On the other hand, demonstrating their commitment to
traditional marriage, lawmakers both passed a law limiting marriage contracts to
those between a man and woman and sent to state voters a constitutional amendment proposal that would grant the state legislature the power to outlaw samesex marriage. In November, 1998, Hawaii voters approved that amendment by a
69 to 29 percent margin, thus mooting the Baehr litigation. 25
Baehr did much more than set in motion an intrastate dialogue about samesex marriage. After Baehr, "an issue that had been a curiosity became an apocalyptic sensation." 26 State lawmakers, fearing that lesbians and gays would travel
to Hawaii to get married and then seek to have those marriages recognized at
home, enacted legislation prohibiting recognition of same-sex marriages.
Between 1995 and 2001, thirty-five states enacted nonrecognition laws Y For its
part, Congress enacted and President Clinton signed the 1996 Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). 28 DOMA, as the House Committee report put it, was a
"response to a very particular development in the State ofHawaii." 29 Echoing the
concerns of state nonrecognition laws, Congress declared that "permitting
homosexual couples to marry in Hawaii threatens to have very real consequences
both on federal law and on the laws (especially the marriage laws) of the various
States." 30
Baehr, it would seem, did more harm than good to the cause of same-sex
marriage. Outside of Hawaii, the federal DOMA and state nonrecognition statutes were a huge setback for proponents of same-sex marriage. In Hawaii, the
state constitutional amendment foreclosed court-ordered same-sex marriage;
proponents of same-sex marriage would now have to convince state lawmakers
to repeal existing bans on same-sex marriage. The question remains: did the

24. Martin Bowley, Same-Sex Couples, Different Rules, THE LAWYER, Sept. 16, 1997 at 13.
25. For a detailed discussion of the politics behind the Hawaii Marriage amendment,
see David Organ Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning, and
Fate, 22 U. HAw. L. REv. 19 (2000).
26. EsKRIDGE , supra note 19, at 26.
27. !d. at 27-28.
28. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) .
29. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664 at 2 (1996) .
30. Id.

90

NEW FRON TI ER S O F STATE C ON STIT U TI O NAL LAW

Hawaii Supreme Court have reason to think that its ruling would prompt a
counterproductive in-state backlash and, if so, what should it have done?
To start, the Hawaii Supreme Court, by taking the lead on this issue, did not
know that court-ordered same-sex marriage would prove to be a nationwide sensation. This issue was not on the national radar at the time of the decision;
indeed, it was the uproar over Baehr that prompted Gallup to start polling on
same-sex marriage in 1996. So what did the Hawaii Supreme Court know? It
knew that there was nationwide hostility to President Clinton's efforts to significantly expand gay rights protections. At the very time that the Hawaii Supreme
Court decided Baehr, lawmakers were crafting the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" law
that prevented open gays from serving in the military. The court also knew that
social conservatives were paying close attention to the case. The Rutherford
Institute, for example, filed an amicus brief urging the state court to reject samesex marriage. 31 More significant, the court probably knew that Hawaii voters did
not support same-sex marriage. A 1991 Honolulu Star Bulletin poll found that
"only 34 percent [of Hawaii residents] think couples of the same sex should be
allowed to marry and only 36 percent think such couples should be allowed to
adopt children." 32 The court may also have known that national gay rights interest groups played no role in the filing of the lawsuit, worried that the case was
corning too early. 33 And finally, the court knew that it was easy to amend the
Hawaii Constitution-all that is needed to refer a constitutional amendment to
a majority referendum vote is the support of a majority of lawmakers over two
legislative sessions (or a two-thirds supermajority in one session).
All of these bits of information suggest that the Hawaii Supreme Court had
reason to fear an in-state backlash to a decision supporting same-sex marriage.
At the same time, the Hawaii Court was well aware of the "island's history of
tolerance and the state's broad privacy law," that Hawaii was the first state to
legalize abortion , and that close to half of Hawaii's marriages are interraciaJ.3•
Put another way, the court knew that the people of Hawaii were more likely to
accept same-sex marriage than the citizens of any other state.
Assuming that Hawaii's Supreme Court sincerely believed that same-sex marriages should be legal. the question becomes: why wait? The answer, I think, is that
certain risks are not worth taking. First, by ruling that all same-sex classifications
were subject to strict scrutiny review, the court created incentives for opponents of

31. Linda Hosek, Group Says Gays Should Not Get OK to Marry, HoNOLULU STAR
BuLLETIN, May 23, 1992 at A-3.
32. Linda Hosek, Residents Draw the Line on Some Gay Rights, HONOLULU STAR
BuLLETIN, Apr. 24, 1991 at A-4.
33. EsKRIDGE, supra note 19, at 16-17.
34. Linda Hosek, Isles May Be First for Gay Marriage, HoNOLULU STAR BuLLETIN, Apr.
24, 1991 at A-1.; Sherry Jacobson, Hawaii Debates Gay Marriage: States May Recognize Such
Unions After Court Ruling, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, Sept. 17, 1993 at A-1.
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same-sex marriage to harden their position and to look for ways either to argue
that the same-sex prohibition satisfies strict review or to amend the Hawaii
Constitution to forbid same-sex unions. Instead, the court should have looked for
ways in which the state and Hawaiian people could have found a way to work
within parameters set by the court. For example, the court could have signaled its
willingness to consider domestic partner or civil union legislation. Hawaii lawmakers were open to such legislative outs; in the wake of Baehr, Hawaii lawmakers
enacted sweeping domestic partnership legislation. Second, not only did the
Hawaii court go too far, it went too fast. An intermediate state court had upheld the
same-sex marriage prohibition. Rather than fill the breach immediately, the Hawaii
Supreme Court could have declined to hear the case without expressing any opinion about the constitutionality of the marriage ban. That is precisely what the U.S.
Supreme Court did in 1955 when, fearing a political backlash, it delayed ruling on
a constitutional challenge to Virginia's anti-miscegenation law. 35
Let me be clear: unlike other critics of the Hawaii Supreme Court (who point
to the federal DOMA and nonrecognition statutes passed by states other than
Hawaii), my criticism focuses on the state court's failure to think about in-state
concerns. The Hawaii Court should have either refused to hear the appeal in this
case or decided the case narrowly so as to limit backlash.
The Triumph ofMinimalism: Vermont. Six years after the Hawaii court's misstep
in Baehr, the Vermont Supreme Court took a fundamentally different approach to
same-sex marriage in Baker v State.36 Although finding that the Vermont
Constitution guarantees same-sex couples "the common benefit, protection, and
security that Vermont law provides opposite-sex married couples," the Vermont
court refused to extend marriage protections to same-sex couples. The court
instead ruled that Vermont's existing statute should remain in effect "for a reasonable period of time to enable the Legislature to consider and enact implementing legislation in an orderly and expeditious fashion." 37 By remanding the case to
the state legislature, Vermont opened the door for state lawmakers to determine
if they wanted to legalize same-sex marriage or, alternatively, enact civil union
legislation that would provide "marriage protections to same-sex couples."
In explaining its refusal to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples, the
court spoke openly about its fear of a counterproductive in-state backlash.
Expressing its desire both to issue a remedy that would endure and to provide
"[greater] protections for same-sex relationships than have been recognized by"
any state supreme court other than Hawaii, the court concluded that it would be
too politically risky to order the state to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. Indeed, the court chastised a concurring opinion that called for the

35. for a defense of the Court's decision, see ALEXANDER BI CKEL, THE LEAST D ANGEROUS
174 (1962).
36. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
37. !d. at 886.
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outright recognition of same-sex marriage as "significantly insulated from
reality."38
For reasons I will soon detail, it is far from clear whether Vermonters would
have repudiated a state supreme court decision ordering same-sex marriage. At
the same time, the Vermont court's political calculation was eminently sensible.
To start, the Baker decision took place against the backdrop of Hawaii's repudiation of same-sex marriage in Baehr. More than that, Alaska lawmakers and voters
preempted an ongoing challenge to Alaska's marriage laws by approving a constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage. 39 Specifically, in the immediate wake of a February 1998 trial court ruling that same-sex couples had a
fundamental right to marry, Alaska lawmakers (in March 1998) put a constitutional amendment proposal on the November ballot. That proposal was approved
by a lopsided 68 to 32 percent vote.
The Hawaii and Alaska experiences are relevant for another reason. The
Alaska and Hawaii constitutional amendment fights were financed, in part, by
out-of-state interest groups. The national movement to enact the federal DOMA
and state non-enforcement statutes was also propelled by national interest
groups. Throughout the 1990s, moreover, social conservatives had pushed (with
great success) state-wide initiatives limiting gay rights in at least a dozen states.
So when the Vermont Supreme Court received seventeen amicus briefs from
national interest groups, it had reason to know that a decision validating samesex marriage would trigger an intense political battle over whether Vermonters,
like Hawaiians and Alaskans, should approve a state constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage. And if that were not enough, a poll taken shortly
before the release of the Baker decision revealed that Vermonters, by a 56 to 33
percent margin, supported a constitutional amendment proposal to "keep
Vermont's definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman." 40
Against this backdrop, there is little doubt that judicial validation of same-sex
marriage would have triggered a donnybrook. A constitutional amendment
would have been introduced, and national interest groups would have invested
significant time and resources in this constitutional amendment battle. At the
same time, there is reason to think that a constitutional amendment proposal
would have failed. National trends pointed to growing acceptance of gay rights. 41

38. Id. at 888.
39. For a detailed treatment of the events leading up to the Alaska constitutional
amendment, see Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People's
Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REv. 213 (1999) .
40. Take it to the People, Press Release, Support for Traditional Marriage Remains Strong in
Vermont, Dec. 16, 1999.
41. By 1999, the social conservative campaign against gay rights had slowed. A 1996
Supreme Court decision, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) , cast doubt on the constitutionality of anti-gay initiatives. A 1998 Georgia Supreme Court decision nullified--<m
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In Vermont, the Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights had scored numerous
legislative successes in the early 1990s-so much so that a public relations campaign for same-sex marriage was launched in 1994. 42 And although Vermonters
opposed same-sex marriage, it was far from clear that state lawmakers would
pursue a constitutional amendment banning it. Vermont's constitutional amendment process is "notoriously difficult. . . . Legislators can introduce amendments
only once every four years. If approved, an amendment must pass in two consecutive two-year legislative sessions. Only then can people vote on the
proposal. "43
The fact that a constitutional amendment proposal might have failed, however, does not mean that the Vermont Supreme Court erred in Baker. Even
assuming that the court backed same-sex marriage, it had good reason to minimize very real risks. By leaving it to the state legislature to sort out how best to
remedy the state's illegal discrimination against same-sex couples, the "court, in
effect, forced the legislature to join it in taking responsibility for fashioning and
implementing a remedy."« In so doing, the court shifted the debate on same-sex
marriage. Instead of fighting over a possible amendment to the state constitution, the focus of the Vermont legislature was whether to enact a civil union bill
or legalize same-sex marriage. 45
By leaving "breathing space for participants in the democratic process," Baker
was able to build on "an extended legislative willingness to recognize and protect
non-traditional families , while at the same time declining to disturb the
yet-to-be-repudiated view of traditional families ."46 A decision demanding
marriage rights for same-sex couples would have run against the grain ofVermont
traditions and facilitated adversarial politics. More to the point, Baker exemplifies
what the new federalism should and should not be. The Vermont Supreme Court

state constitutional grounds-the anti-sodomy statute that the Supreme Court had upheld
in Bowers v Hardwick. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E. 2d 18 (Ga. 1998). Public opinion polls,
moreover, reveal ever-growing support of gay rights, especially among younger voters. See
Jack Egan et aJ., Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 234
(Nathaniel Persily eta!. , eds., 2008) . There was thus less intense opposition to same-sex
marriage in 1999 than there had been in 1993 (when the Hawaii Supreme Court decided

Baehr).
42. Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REv.
15, 25-30 (2000).
43 . David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for a Vermont
Marriage Amendment, 25 VT. L. REv. 61 , 68 (2000).
44. Tonja Jacobi, Same Sex Marriage in Vermont: Implications of Legislative Remand for
the judiciary's Role, 26 VT. L. REv. 381 , 403 (2002) .
45. See William N. Eskridge, Liberal Reflections on the jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64
ALB. L. REV. 853 , 870-76 (2001) .
46. Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the Passive Virtue of Baker v. State, 25 VT. L. REv. 93 , 109
(2000). See also Johnson , supra note 42 .
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looked to out-of-state experiences to inform its judgment about in-state concerns.
And although the court may have succeeded in establishing a right to same-sex
marriage, it minimized the risks of backlash while setting in motion a process of
incremental reform. State lawmakers could embrace the broader right, but, if not,
the court could return to the issue of same-sex marriage. That option was not
available to the Hawaii Supreme Court, whose unilateralism prompted a constitutional amendment forbidding such court-ordered reform.
The Massachusetts Gamble: judicial Hubris or the New judicial Federalism at
Work? 47 In November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 48 that the state ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional. Finding that the state either had to allow same-sex
couples the right to marry or eliminate civil marriage altogether, the court gave
state lawmakers 180 days to "take such action as it may deem appropriate in light
of this opinion." 49 In February 2004, acting on a request from state lawmakers to
clarifY this ruling, the court said that only full and equal marriage rights for
same-sex couples-not proposed civil union legislation-would satisfY the
court's ruling. Three months later, Massachusetts became the first state to allow
same-sex marriage.
Reaction to the Massachusetts decision was intense. Inside Massachusetts,
Governor Mitt Romney pushed for a constitutional amendment to overturn the
ruling. And although lawmakers did not approve an amendment, a constitutional
convention was convened in February 2004, and a proposed ban on same-sex marriage passed through a first-stage vote in March 2004. After same-sex couples
began marrying in May 2004, however, public opposition to same-sex marriage
began to wane. 50 Indeed, state voters rewarded opponents of the proposed constitutional ban in the November 2004 election cycle: all opponents of the ban won
reelection, some proponents of the ban lost reelection, and opponents of the ban
won six of eight open seats. 51 By March 2005, support for same-sex marriage

47. In writing about Massachusetts, I have benefited greatly from the work of Tonja
Jacobi, whose published work is cited in this section. I also benefited from a student paper
I supervised in the spring 2007 semester (before Professor Jacobi's published her
Goodridge-related scholarship). That paper was written by Matthew Koldziej , a 2007 graduate of George Washington Law School. Although I suggested the paper topic to
Mr. Koldziej , my interest in writing this chapter was nonetheless spurred on by
Mr. Koldziej's outstanding paper.
48. 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
49. Id. at 970.
50. Tonja Jacobi, How Massachusetts Got Gay Marriage: The Intersection of Public Opinion,
Legislative Action, and judicial Power, 15 J. CONTE MP. LEGAL ISS UES 219, 221 (2006) .
51. Tonja Jacobi, Sharing the Love: The Political Power of Remedial Delay in Same·Sex
Marriage Cases, 15 LAw & SEXUALITY REv. 11, 39--41 (2006) .
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among Massachusetts residents had increased to 56 percent. 52 In September 2005,
lawmakers rejected a proposed constitutional ban of same-sex marriage by a vote
of 157 to 39. 53 With an increasingly supportive legislature and citizenry, the campaign to ban same-sex marriage floundered. In November 2006, lawmakers refused
to vote on a citizen-proposed ballot initiative. In July 2008, lawmakers repealed a
state law prohibiting the issuance of marriage licenses to couples who could not
marry in their home state, paving the way for same-sex couples from other states
to marry in Massachusetts.
Outside of Massachusetts, Goodridge proved to be a lightning rod. On the one
hand, the decision was part of a mix of factors that in the spring and summer of
2004 prompted city and county officials to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples in San Francisco, California; Portland, Oregon; New Paltz, New York;
and elsewhere. 54 And while state courts uniformly rejected these local initiatives
as unauthorized usurpations of state law, Goodridge undoubtedly contributed to
the willingness of gay rights interests to push for same-sex marriage. On the
other hand, the collective impact of these local initiatives and Goodridge was to
energize opponents of same-sex marriage. In an effort to appeal to their social
conservative base, Republicans in Congress sought both to amend the
Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage and to enact legislation stripping the
federal courts of jurisdiction in same-sex marriage cases. Although Congress did
not act on either proposal, there is little question that social conservatives saw
same-sex marriage as a wedge issue in the November 2004 elections. Most telling, thirteen states approved constitutional amendment proposals forbidding
same-sex marriage. 55 Moreover, conservative Christians helped propel the candidacies of George W. Bush and other Republicans. In Ohio, for example, "political
analysts credited the ballot measure with spurring Republican voter turnout in
the socially conservative western and southern portions of the state." 56 Same-sex
marriage also worked to the advantage of Republicans in U.S. Senate races , providing the margin of victory in Kentucky and South Dakota. 57
Goodridge has been roundly criticized for prompting a national backlash
against gay rights interests. Indeed, criticism of the case has almost exclusively
focused on this question. The issue of in-state backlash has received, at best,
52. ScottS . Greenberger, One Year Later, Nation Divided on Gay Marriage, BosT. GLOBE,
May 15, 2005 .
53. Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Rejects Bill to Eliminate Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept
15, 2005 at A-14.
54. For a discussion of how these initiatives (and other related matters) shaped public
attitudes towards gay rights during this time, see Egan et al. , supra note 41.
55. See Michael) . Klarman , Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge) , 104 MICH . L. REv.
431 (2005) .
56. James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIM ES, Nov. 4,
2004 at A-4.
57. See Klarman supra note 55, at 468-70.
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scant attention. This is truly unfortunate. State courts, as explained earlier, ought
not to sacrifice their essential sovereignty by taking out-of-state backlash into
account and thereby limiting rights protections for their citizens. What then of
potential in-state backlash at the time of Goodridge? That is something that the
Massachusetts court should have taken into account. For reasons I will now
detail, the Supreme Judicial Court had good reason to think that a decision granting marriage rights to same-sex couples would withstand in-state resistance.
Furthermore, by delaying its remedial order in the case, the court successfully
minimized in-state backlash. 58
To start, the Supreme Judicial Court undoubtedly knew that its decision would
prompt an outcry in Massachusetts and throughout the nation, including efforts
to amend the Massachusetts Constitution. In anticipation of Goodridge, an initiative amendment to ban same-sex marriage was proposed in the Massachusetts
legislature in the summer of 2002. Although this measure was not acted on,
lawmakers promised to seek a constitutional ban on same"sex marriage if the
Supreme Judicial Court found a right to same-sex marriage in Goodridge. The
Supreme Judicial Court also knew that these efforts would be backed by many of
the "[h]undreds of [interest] groups" that had signed amicus briefs in the case,
including "Catholic, Protestant fundamentalist and Orthodox Jewish groups." 59
The volatility of the same-sex marriage issue was also fueled by two June 2003
developments: Canada's granting of marital rights to same-sex couples and the
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Lawrence v. Texas that anti-sodomy statutes were
unconstitutional. 60 Lawrence is especially relevant, for Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion claimed that the Court's decision paved the way for a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage. 61 Lawrence fueled public repudiations of samesex marriage by the Southern Baptist Conference and U.S. Catholic bishops Y lt
also resulted in same-sex marriage becoming the defining issue for social conservatives, including the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family. These
groups spoke about the need "for the American people" to "rise up and defend
this indispensable institution" because "the homosexual activist movement . ..
is poised to administer a devastating . . . blow to the traditional family." 63

58. For a detailed treatment of this issue, see Jacobi, supra note 50.
59. Kathleen Burge, SJC Puts Off a Decision on Gay Marriage, BosT. GLOB E, July 15,
2003 at A-1; Kathleen Burge, S]C to Weigh Arguments on Gay Marriage, BosT. GLOB E, Mar.
2, 2003 at A-1.
60. See Egan et al., supra note 41.
61. See Esther Kaplan, The Religious Right's Sense ofSiege is Fueling a Resurgence, NATION,
July 5, 2004 at 33.
62. See Klarman, supra note 55 , at 460.
63 . Mary Leonard, Gay Marriage Stirs Conservatives Again, BosT. GLOB E, Sept. 28, 2003
at A-1; Christopher Marquis, U.S. Gays Who Marry in Canada Face Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES ,
June 19, 2003 at A-8.
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Finally, Lawrence contributed to an increase in public opposition to same-sex marriage at the very time that the Massachusetts court was set to decide Goodridge.
The Massachusetts court was well aware of all this. Just weeks after the U.S .
Supreme Court decided Lawrence, the Massachusetts court announced that it
would delay its decision in Goodridge. Three months earlier (when hearing oral
arguments in Goodridge) , justices on the Massachusetts court likewise signaled
their sensitivity to the interplay between the court, the Massachusetts legislature,
and the public. In particular, the justices quizzed both sides on the appropriateness of the court resolving the same-sex marriage issue and the related possibility that Massachusetts voters (through a constitutional amendment) or legislators
(through civil union legislation) might be able to resolve this issue. 64 By the time
the justices decided Goodridge, they almost certainly knew that lawmakers supported civil union legislation but not the constitutionalization of same-sex
marriage.
Why then did the Massachusetts court test the limits of its authority by establishing a right to same-sex marriage? The short answer is that the justices supported a right to same-sex marriage and thought that a decision establishing
such a right would stick. To start, the Massachusetts Constitution is difficult to
amend. Massachusetts is one of nineteen states that has had only one constitution, and among those states, it has the lowest amendment rate. 65 Amendments
must be voted on in two successive legislative sessions before being submitted
to the voters. This process is, by definition, time-consuming. It is intended to
ensure that there is continuing public and lawmaker support for an amendment
proposal. Against this backdrop, public opinion seemed to be on the side of
Goodridge. Opinion polls taken just before the decision revealed that Massachusetts
residents supported same-sex marriage 50 to 44 percent. And although Goodridge
might have influenced public opinion (by focusing both state and national attention on same-sex marriage), the justices had reason to think that the decision
would not result in sustained support for a constitutional amendment banning
same-sex marriage. In addition to somewhat favorable polling numbers at the
time of the decision, public support for gay rights , including same-sex marriage,
was on the rise . That trend was likely to continue as younger voters overwhelmingly
supported gay rights, including same-sex marriage. More than that, the justices
knew that their decision would take effect in May 2004-at least two years before
a constitutional amendment proposal could make its way to voters. That would
likely mitigate opposition to same-sex marriage; in particular, the burden of
inertia would likely favor it. A constitutional amendment would ask voters to

64. From judges, Pointed Questions, BosT. GLOBE , Mar. 5, 2003 at A-6.
65. Donald S. Lutz, Towards a Theory of Constitutional Amendment 248-49, in
R ESPONDING TO IM PERFECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) .
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take away a preexisting right rather than (as was true in other states) back up
existing state policy against same-sex marriage. 66
The justices, moreover, took strategic steps to mitigate public and lawmaker
opposition to their rulings. Rather than call for immediate implementation of
court-ordered same-sex marriage, the Massachusetts court remanded the case to
the legislature for 180 days. At the same time, by ruling on "basic premises of
individual liberty and equality of the law," the court also made clear that samesex couples had a constitutional right to marry (strongly suggesting that civil
union legislation would likewise be unconstitutional) Y This legislative remand
suggests one of two things. First, it created an escape hatch so that the court
could embrace civil union legislation if the in-state backlash against its decision
were truly severe. Second, the court-albeit with a wink and a nod-returned the
issue to the democratic branches to build public and lawmaker support for samesex marriage. Not only did the court signal that the "legislature retains broad
regulatory power over civil marriage," it sought to facilitate legislative support
of same-sex unions (or at least diminish legislative opposition to same-sex
marriage). For their part, Massachusetts lawmakers took up a civil union bill and
asked the court if such a bill would satisfy Goodridge. Even though the
Massachusetts court turned down this request, the stay succeeded in drawing
lawmakers into the process and, in so doing, changing the baseline about samesex unions away from legislative opposition and toward some form oflegislative
acceptance. 68
For a court interested both in advancing its vision of constitutional truth and
maximizing its power, Goodridge is a masterstroke. The court had good reason to
think its decision would not be overturned by a constitutional amendment; the
court facilitated public and legislative acceptance of its decision by delaying the
effective date of the remedy and remanding the case to the state legislature; and
the court created a remedial delay that allowed it the opportunity to back away
from its ruling if there were severe public and legislative opposition. Also, as
justices on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court are not subject to recall
election, there was no risk of the decision limiting their ability to stay on the
court.
California: A Calculated Risk that Backfired. On May 15, 2008, the California
Supreme Court overturned the state's ban on same-sex marriage.69 At that time,

66. It is also possible that public awareness of same-sex couples who marry might
mitigate opposition to same-sex marriage. This would be especially true if there were
favorable newspaper and television coverage about the same-sex couples who choose to
marry. As it turns out, opposition to same-sex marriage did wane after same-sex couples
began to marry. See jacobi supra note 51.
67. Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 , 958 (Mass. 2003) .
68. For a more detailed presentation of this idea, see jacobi, supra note 51, at 28-38.
69. In reMarriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008) .
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the justices had good reason to think that their decision both matched prevailing
social and political forces and was especially vulnerable to political attack On the
one hand, public opinion polls, the action of state lawmakers and Governor
Schwarzenegger, and editorial commentary by the state's leading newspaper all
suggested that California was ready to embrace gay marriage. On the other, antigay marriage groups had mobilized after the court agreed to decide the case so
that California voters would have an opportunity to vote on a proposed constitutional amendment that would ban same-sex marriage. On November 4, 2008,
California voters narrowly approved this amendment.7°
Therefore, the California Supreme Court was simultaneously sensitive and
tone deaf to the central lessons of this chapter. By granting certiorari to hear this
case in December 2006, the California court paid insufficient attention both to
the risks of in-state backlash and to the out-of-state backlash that followed
Goodridge. When deciding the case, however, the court had good reason to strike
down the state prohibition of same-sex marriage. At that time, the risks of instate backlash, while substantial, did not warrant the court's retreat from its
preferred position in the case.
When agreeing to rule on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, the
California Supreme Court was certainly aware of the backlash against same-sex
marriage that followed Goodridge and the contemporaneous efforts oflocalities,
most notably San Francisco, to recognize it. Indeed, the case was an appeal by
San Francisco of a state appeals court ruling that nullified San Francisco mayor
Gavin Newsom's efforts to grant marriage licenses to about 4,000 same-sex
couples. More than that, the court knew that post-Goodridge efforts to constitutionalize same-sex marriage had failed. In 2006, two state supreme courts,
Washington and New York, reaffirmed state prohibitions on same-sex marriage
and a third state supreme court, New Jersey, concluded that the state must allow
for civil unions but not same-sex marriage.
The California court also knew that well-funded Christian conservatives were
poised to put an initiative against same-sex marriage on the 2008 ballot. With
2006 public opinion polls showing that Californians opposed same-sex marriage
by a 50 to 44 percent margin, the court had good reason to fear that a decision
legalizing same-sex marriage would be turned back by voters. In particular, the
California Constitution is far easier to amend then most state constitutions. A
constitutional amendment initiative is placed on the ballot after 8 percent of the
total voters in the last gubernatorial race sign a petition calling for the amendment. And once on the ballot, a simple majority is sufficient to amend the
Constitution. For this very reason, the California Constitution is routinely
amended-so much so that at eight times the length of the U.S. Constitution, it

70. In May 2009, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8 while simultaneously declaring it did not nullify same-sex marriages performed before its enactment.
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has been labeled a "bloated mishmash" filled with "obfuscation, clutter and
dysfunction."7 1
Put another way: California was no Massachusetts. Unlike the Massachusetts
court, the California court could not escape the fact that its Constitution was
especially vulnerable to amendment and that a decision backing same-sex marriage might well be turned back by California voters. 72 The California court,
moreover, was well aware of on-the-ground facts that cut against its recognizing
a right to same-sex marriage. Not only were opponents of same-sex marriage
poised to launch an initiative drive, voters in thirteen states, responding to the
efforts of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and Mayor Newsom, had in
2004 approved constitutional amendment initiatives outlawing same-sex marriage. And while the pendulum of public opinion was shifting in favor of samesex unions, there was little reason for the California court to think that public
opposition to same-sex marriage would turn into voter support for it during the
window between December 2006 (when the court agreed to hear the case) and
November 2008 (when California voters would almost certainly be asked to
approve a constitutional ban on it) .
Lessons from other states as well as in-state political realities suggest that the
California court jumped the gun. The court should have held off on deciding this
question for a few more years, when public support for same-sex marriage was
likely to command clear majority support among California voters. In making
this point, I do not mean to suggest that when granting certiorari in this case, the
court should have known that a decision legalizing same-sex marriage was
doomed to fail. Leading state newspapers supported same-sex marriage, state
lawmakers approved a bill legalizing same-sex marriage in September 2005, and
Governor Schwarzenegger's veto of that bill signaled that he too would support
a court ruling backing same-sex marriage rights. In particular, the governor's
veto message said that the power to negate California's law banning same-sex
marriage (passed by a 2000 voter initiative) was reserved to state courts (which
could declare the initiative unconstitutional) or "another vote of the people of our
state." 73 Also, by December 2006, Massachusetts voters and lawmakers had
rallied behind same-sex marriage, suggesting that the political landscape of2004

71. Edward L. Lascher Jr. et al., It 's Too Easy to Amend the California Constitution, L.A.
Feb. 4, 2009.
72. In drawing a comparison between the constitutional amendment process in
California and Massachusetts, this discussion assumes that the nullification of state court
decisions by voter initiatives is the very type of backlash that state courts should seek to
avoid. With that said, a competing argument can be made-namely, that states with easyto-amend constitutions should engage voters in constitutional dialogues by staking out
positions that voters and lawmakers might not independently pursue.
73. Michael Finnegan & Maura Dolan, Citing Prop. 22, Gov. Rejects Gay Marriage Bill,
L. A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005 at 1.
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might give way to increasing public, elite, and lawmaker support. In other words ,
the California court may have taken a strategic gamble: thinking it could make
history by riding the crest of a growing wave in support of same-sex marriage
rights.
One final comment about the California Supreme Court's decision to hear the
same-sex marriage case: in determining whether it should run risks in order to
recognize a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage, the court may have
considered two other variables. First, even if the court refused to hear this case,
it is quite possible that opponents of same-sex marriage would have pushed for
a ballot initiative amending the state constitution. Second, unlike Vermont, there
was little to be gained by staking out a middle-ground position by establishing a
right to civil unions. California's then-existing domestic partnership laws granted
domestic partners most of the same rights and responsibilities as marriage
under California law. These laws, moreover, were politically popular-a 2003
effort to repeal these laws through a state-wide initiative did not attract enough
signatures even to make it to the ballot. For this reason, the same-sex marriage
issue was largely symbolic. 74
When the California court issued its decision in May 2008, elected officials,
leading newspapers, and California voters supported same-sex marriage. A May
2008 Field Poll found that California registered voters supported same-sex marriage
by a 51 to 42 percent margin. 75 For their part, state lawmakers reenacted a bill
legalizing same-sex marriage in 2007. And although Governor Schwarzenegger
vetoed that bill, the governor had also declared one month before the court's
ruling that efforts to amend the state constitution to ban same-sex marriage were
a "total waste of time" and that he would "fight against that. " Mayors of California's
three largest cities (Los Angeles , San Diego, and San Francisco) all backed samesex marriage as did nearly all of the state's leading newspapers.
Against this backdrop, the California Supreme Court, having already spurred
on a voter initiative by agreeing to decide the case, had no reason to back away
fro m its preferred ·position on this issue. The fact that California voters rejected
same-sex marriage does not undercut this conclusion; instead, the populist repudiation of same-sex marriage underscores the fact that states with easy-to-amend
constitutions should be especially sensitive to the risks of in-state backlash. In
other words, it was not enough that voters, the media , and the political establishment in California were more supportive of same-sex marriage than in other states.
The California Court, when agreeing to decide the same-sex marriage issue,

74. When upholding Proposition 8, the California Supreme Court emphasized that
Proposition 8 did not fundamentally change the legal rights of same-sex couples, which
suggests the Court might have reached a different conclusion if Proposition 8 meaningfully curtailed fundamental rights. Strauss v. California, 46 Cal. 4th 364 (2009) .
75. Bill Ainsworth, 51 percent Support Same-Sex Marriage, THE SAN DI EGO UNIONTRIB UNE, May 28, 2008 at Al.
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should have paid more attention to the risks of in-state backlash-risks amplified
by nationwide resistance to same-sex marriage after Goodridge.

IV. CONCLUSION

State courts can and should participate in a nationwide conversation about constitutional values. State courts must also operate as independent sovereigns and,
consequently, cannot consider the extraterritorial effects of their decisions. This
chapter has suggested that state courts can thread this needle by paying attention
to the experiences of other states in sorting out whether their rulings may prompt
a counterproductive in-state backlash. In this way, state courts simultaneously
operate as independent sovereigns while participating in a nationalistic conversation about core constitutional values-values that transcend any one state.
The ongoing battle over same-sex marriage exemplifies the ways states can
retain their sovereignty while simultaneously learning from the experiences of
other states. The on-the-ground facts of same-sex marriage changed dramatically
from 1993 to 2008. State courts should have paid attention to those changes,
especially the intra- and interstate ramifications of other state court decisions. In
so doing, state courts could have learned effectively to marshal resources and
render decisions that would prove politically acceptable to voters and elected officials in their states. Needless to say, profound differences among state court systems allow some states to recognize rights claims that other states cannot. Most
significant, states with easy-to-amend constitutions need to be especially sensitive to the risks of counterproductive populist attacks on their decision making.
State courts should pay attention to the ways in which they are both similar
and different from each other and, in so doing, participate in a nationwide conversation about rights. For this very reason, state supreme courts should recognize that justice delayed may not be justice denied. By paying attention to in-state
but not out-of-state backlash, state courts can respect their essential sovereignty
while being a part of the new judicial federalism .

